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Introduction
Heterogeneities among resource users pose substantial barriers to cooperation and coordination in
solving common-pool resource dilemmas.1 For instance, a senior surface water user in Colorado
may refuse to cooperate with junior surface water users in the same watershed knowing that his
senior water rights are protected under the prior appropriation doctrine. Or, irrigators situated at
the head end of a canal may fail to share in canal maintenance or limit excess water uses so that
those at the tail end receive some water. Heterogeneities, whether they stem from physical,
cultural, or institutional sources, position resource users differently in their access and use of a
common-pool resource. Resource users may find that those differences present real challenges to
gaining a common understanding of their shared problems, to communication, to devising fair
rules of access and use, and to monitoring and enforcement of those rules.
It is generally accepted that heterogeneities among resource users can pose substantial challenges
to gaining user participation and cooperation in addressing shared problems. Invariably, case
studies of resource users failing to address shared problems point to some sort of heterogeneity as
one of the root causes of failure. When substantial resource user heterogeneity exists within a
common-pool resource situation, predictions are grim: resource users are unlikely, or substantially
less likely, to address and resolve shared problems.
What is much less understood or accepted is how resource users overcome their differences and
reach cooperative agreements for governing a shared resource.2 Many common-pool resource
situations in which dilemmas have been addressed were characterized, at some point, by resource
user heterogeneity.  In spite of heterogeneities, resource users confronted and attempted to
resolve shared problems. The mechanisms that users utilized to simultaneously overcome their
heterogeneities and address common-pool resource dilemmas are the focus of this paper. These
mechanisms are diverse, ranging from institutional arrangements to substitutes for or
complements to common pool resource flows. While diverse, these mechanisms share one
characteristic; they attempt to minimize the differences among resource users while creating a
common course of action for solving shared problems.
In examining and evaluating the mechanisms by which heterogeneities among resource users may
be overcome, this paper will explore a number of issues. First, the sources and types of
heterogeneities among resource users will be examined within the context of the Institutional
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Analysis and Development framework. The framework permits a systematic examination of
heterogeneities. Next, the obstacles and barriers to cooperation and coordination that
heterogeneities create for resource users will be explored. Then the mechanisms by which
heterogeneities may be overcome will be described and evaluated. Finally, how these mechanisms
may be used in the design of institutional arrangements for solving common pool resource
dilemmas will be discussed.
Resource User Heterogeneity and the IAD Framework
The Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework provides a useful approach for
organizing and carefully analyzing heterogeneities. The IAD framework builds on the concept of
an action arena. An action arena consists of actors and an action situation. An action situation
structures the setting in which individuals interact. “Action situations refer to the social space
where individuals interact, exchange goods and services, engage in appropriation and provision
activities, solve problems, or fight (among the many things that individuals do in action
situations)” (Ostrom et al. 1994:28).  The action situation consists of several elements –
participants, positions, actions, potential outcomes, linkages between actions and outcomes,
information, and the costs and benefits assigned to actions and outcomes (Ostrom et al. 1994:29).
Actors, or participants in action situations, are characterized by preferences, information
processing capabilities, selection criteria, and resources. “The actor is, thus, the animating force
that allows the analyst to generate predictions about likely outcomes given the structure of the
situation” (Ostrom et al. 1994:35).
Each of the characteristics of the actor and each of the elements of the action situation represents
a potential heterogeneity. For instance, actors may differ substantially in the resources that they
have to support their activity in the situation. One actor may have access to scientific and legal
experts as well as generous funding sources that would allow it to take any action that it was
physically and legally capable of. Another actor may have very limited funding sources and only
her own time, placing tight constraints on the actions that she can undertake. Actors may differ in
their preferences over actions and outcomes as well. One actor may prefer the maintenance of a
relatively pristine river riparian corridor, while another may prefer the more manicured look of a
golf course with a river running through it.
The elements of the action situation also present potential heterogeneities. Actors may differ in
relation to the types of actions that they are required, permitted, or forbidden to take in a
situation. One actor may have the authority to use a well-defined amount of surface water,
whereas another actor may not have the authority to use surface water, but be permitted to pump
as much groundwater as he can put to reasonable use, regardless if the groundwater pumping
reduces the surface water flows. Actors may also differ on the types and amount of information
that they possess about themselves and the situation, and the costs and the benefits that accrue to
them from the actions and outcomes they collectively engage in and realize. Thus, the central
conceptual unit of the IAD framework, the action arena, and its constituent parts, allows one to
carefully analyze and pinpoint diverse types of heterogeneities.
4
The malleability of heterogeneities depends on their source. Again, the IAD framework provides
the conceptual tools to address this issue. The action arena is itself defined and constrained by
three sets of variables – attributes of the physical world, attributes of the community, and rules-in-
use (Ostrom et al. 1994:37). “Implicit or explicit assumptions about rules, physical variables, and
the nature of a community all influence the way the seven elements of an action situation are
conceptualized” (Ibid.). Attributes of the physical world include such things as the type of
resource used – whether it is a public good or a common pool resource; whether resource flows
are mobile or stationary (Schlager, Blomquist, and Tang 1994); the distribution of resource flows
across time and space as well as the predictability of such distributions; the location of a cpr
relative to other cprs and population centers, and so forth. Attributes of the community include
“generally accepted norms of behavior, the level of common understanding about action arenas,
the extent to which the preferences are homogeneous, and distribution of resources among
members” (Ostrom et al. 1994:45).
Rules-in-use is the final element that structures an action arena. Rules are “prescriptions that
define what actions (or outcomes) are required, prohibited, or permitted, and the sanctions
authorized if the rules are not followed” (Ostrom et al. 1994:38). Seven broad types of rules
structure an action situation: position, boundary, authority, aggregation, scope, information, and
payoff. These rule types correspond to and substantially define the elements that constitute an
action situation. Boundary rules define the conditions that individuals must meet in order to
participate in an action situation. Position rules define the positions that participants hold.
Authority and scope rules define the actions that participants must, may, or must not take.
Aggregation rules map actions into outcomes, and information rules specify the information
available to each of the participants. Payoff rules specify the benefits and costs associated with
particular actions and outcomes and how those benefits and costs are distributed among
participants. Thus, heterogeneities among participants in an action situation may arise directly
from the rules-in-use.
While the elements of an action arena allow one to identify and categorize heterogeneities, the
factors that structure the action arena identify the sources of those heterogeneities. Whether
heterogeneity among resource users can be neutralized depends on its source. For instance,
resource users may possess different amounts and types of information about a cpr. If the
information differences are due to an information rule that allows some resource users access to
technical information that other resource users are forbidden, the differences may be directly
resolved by changing the information rule. If the information heterogeneity among resource users
is due to substantial distrust and a consequent reluctance to honestly reveal information, then the
heterogeneity is not so directly or easily addressed. In other words, if the source of the
heterogeneity lies in a single rule that structures the action situation, the heterogeneity may be
resolved by changing the rule. If the source of the heterogeneity lies in deep-seated norms and
perceptions, that is, in community attributes, then addressing the heterogeneity presents a much
greater challenge.
The complexity and malleability of heterogeneities furthermore depends on the configural nature
of their sources, which the IAD framework reveals. Heterogeneities often arise from multiple,
overlapping, and interacting sources. Information heterogeneities among resource users may
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result not from a single rule, or from a single community norm, but from a combination of factors.
For instance, some resource users may possess more and better information about the relationship
between actions and outcomes than other resource users in the same cpr situation because they
possess the resources to hire experts to conduct studies of the physical characteristics of the
resource, they are physically positioned in the resource to better track the resource flows,
information rules require government officials to share information with them, and through years
of working together they have developed norms of information sharing. This pronounced
information disparity between the resource users is one that a rule change or providing additional
resources is unlikely to effect.
When, Why, and How Heterogeneities Matter
The ubiquitous nature of heterogeneities among resource users begs the questions of when, why,
and how they matter. There are at least two different answers to these questions. Non-cooperative
game theory suggests that heterogeneities matter when they affect the payoffs actors receive from
different outcomes. There may be a number of cooperative outcomes that resource users prefer
that would allow them to resolve the cpr dilemmas that they experience. However, each of those
outcomes may distribute benefits and costs differently across the resource users, causing conflict
over determining a fair allocation.
Scharpf (1997) presents a non-cooperative game theory example using the Prisoners’ Dilemma
game. As Scharpf (1997:75) explains, the dominant strategy for both players is defection, which
results in their second worst outcome. Furthermore, they cannot unilaterally escape from this
outcome. If one player unilaterally chooses a cooperative strategy she runs the risk of being
exploited, resulting in the worst outcome for her. If binding agreements are possible, as Scharpf
(1997:77) points out, then achieving the cooperative outcome appears easy. Actors prefer the
cooperative outcome to the defection outcome. This is only the case, however, if the cooperative
outcome is symmetrical. As Scharpf (1997:77) argues,
“Real-world constellations will often allow for several “cooperative” solutions that may
differ significantly in their distributive consequences… implying that the common aversion
to the outcome associated with mutual defection is not sufficient to assure agreement on
one of the competing cooperative solutions.”
Why might there be several cooperative solutions? There might be several cooperative solutions
because of heterogeneities among resource users. For instance, some resource users may have
invested more heavily in harvesting technologies than have others. When resource users come to
understand that they must reduce overall harvesting effort in order to maintain the natural
resource stock, those who invested more heavily in harvesting effort may want their additional
investment recognized. Thus, they may support an outcome that does not allocate effort equally,
but that allocates effort proportionate to historic investment in effort (Hackett, Schlager, and
Walker 1994).
Don’t all heterogeneities affect the cooperative outcomes that resource users may achieve? The
answer is no, at least according to non-cooperative game theory. This is demonstrated in a series
of experiments conducted by Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (1994). In these experiments eight
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subjects were given equal endowments which they could invest in Market One, which provided a
constant return per unit invested and/or in Market Two, which was the cpr. The return a subject
received from Market Two was a function of what the subject, plus all other subjects, invested.
The subjects were not allowed to communicate and they made decisions independently of one
another. As a group they achieved the Nash equilibrium, or the non-cooperative outcome.
Ostrom, Gardner and Walker (1994) then changed the information rule and allowed subjects a
few minutes of face-to-face communication. Since, the payoff structure remained unchanged so
too did the prediction – subjects would achieve the Nash equilibrium outcome.  Thus, according
to non-cooperative game theory, heterogeneities only matter if they effect the payoff structure of
the game.
The Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker (1994) experiments demonstrate another point. The non-
cooperative game theory’s answer to when heterogeneities matter is much too limited. The
experiments suggest that heterogeneities that do not change the payoff structure of the game
nevertheless effect the outcomes that are achieved. Once given the opportunity to communicate
and commit themselves to courses of action that they believed would make themselves better off,
subjects quickly discovered and achieved superior outcomes, even though their commitments
were non-binding. What non-cooperative game theory provides is a sufficient condition for when
heterogeneities matter, however, it is not a necessary condition.
Heterogeneities certainly matter in relation to outcomes, as non-cooperative game theory
demonstrates, but heterogeneities also matter in relation to other things. What are some of those
other things? Scharpf (1997) discusses the Negotiator’s Dilemma. The dilemma involves
searching for, perhaps even creating the possibility of optimal solutions while simultaneously
resolving distributive conflicts over the solutions. Searching for, or creating, optimal solutions
entail a distributive dimension. Some solutions will substantially benefit some while modestly
benefiting others. Or, even more difficult is a solution that substantially benefits some, while
making others worse off. Even if total welfare is maximized, this solution can only be reached if
those made worse off are compensated. As Scharpf (1997:121) explains, “The creation of value
will be impeded unless the acceptable sharing of value is assured.” Thus, heterogeneities may
effect the search for optimal solutions, or what Ostrom (1990) calls the problem of supply.3
For example, information asymmetries (or heterogeneities) can have a powerful and negative
effect on both the search for optimal solutions and resolving distributive conflicts in relation to
those solutions. As Scharpf (1997:124) explains:
The successful joint search for better overall solutions requires creativity, effective
communication, and mutual trust, whereas success in the distributive battle depends on the
strategic, and even opportunistic, communication and withholding of available information
–and a good deal of distrust against potential misinformation. This means not only that the
”cooperative” interaction orientation that is conducive to joint learning in the production
dimension is psychologically incompatible with the “competitive” orientation that
facilitates success in distribution but also that the party that contributes most to the search
for better solutions lays itself open to exploitation by a party that concentrates its efforts
on the distributive dimension.
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Information asymmetries can contribute to creating an atmosphere of distrust and deception,
discouraging individuals from working together to find outcomes superior to what they currently
achieve.
Information asymmetries are not the only type of heterogeneity that confounds the search for
institutional arrangements that create opportunities for achieving better outcomes. Any of the
types and sources of heterogeneities identified using the IAD framework can create search
barriers. For instance, individuals with different norms and values concerning the appropriate use
of resources may find it very difficult to even identify a shared understanding of resources that
would permit them to search for acceptable outcomes. Or, some resource users may possess well-
defined, legally enforceable rights in the resource that are superior to those held by all other users.
These well-positioned resource users may refuse to consider any alternative that may infringe on
their property rights, even if that alternative was the one that made everyone better off.
In addition to the negotiator’s dilemma, Scharpf (1997) notes that problems may also emerge in
implementation. For superior outcomes to be achieved, agreements must be faithfully
implemented. Ostrom (1990) breaks implementation into two parts – commitment and
monitoring. Once an agreement has been reached, that is, once the supply problem has been
resolved, individuals must still commit themselves to follow the rules and abide by the agreement.
As Ostrom (1990:44) explains:
On many occasions after an initial agreement to a set of rules, each appropriator must
make further choices. Minimally, the choice at each decision time subsequent to the
agreement can be thought of as the choice between complying to a set of rules, Ct or
breaking the rules in some fashion, Bt. On many occasions, Bt will generate a higher
immediate return for the appropriator than will Ct, unless Bt is detected and a sanction, S,
is imposed that makes Ct>Bt-S.
Heterogeneities can exacerbate the commitment problem in a number of ways. First, the
commitment problem, at least in part, centers on trust. Individuals are more likely to remain
committed to a set of rules if they know that others are also committed. Heterogeneities may
affect the trust that individuals have in each other. For instance, cultural differences or resource
differences may convince individuals that it is okay to break the rules because the only ones that
would be hurt are those from a different group, or those who are wealthy.
Second, a closely related issue involves what Scharpf (1997:84) calls interaction orientations. As
Scharpf (1997:85) explains, “a relationship may assume a character of its own that affects the
valuation of “real” gains and losses and that distinguishes this particular relationship from
“objectively” similar interactions with other parties or with the same party at another time”.
Scharpf identifies four interaction orientations:
• individualism: only gains and losses to the individual are considered
• solidarity: a gain to an individual or to any one the individual is interacting with is
equally valued. This “defines the precondition for unrestricted cooperation”(Scharpf
1997:85).
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• competition: a gain to an individual or a loss to any one the individual is interacting
with is valued equally. What counts, according to Scharpf (1997:86) is the difference
between payoffs.
• altruism: an individual’s payoffs are considered irrelevant, and a gain to another is
considered positive
• hostility: a loss to another is considered a gain to the individual.
Interaction orientations strongly affect the commitment problem. Individuals who act from
solidarity are more likely to remain committed to a set of rules than are individuals who act from
competition. The orientation that individuals take, in turn, may be strongly affected by
heterogeneities. For instance, differences in information about the resource and about other’s uses
of the resource may cause some individuals to cautiously support and abide by an agreement.
They consider only their own gains and losses, that is, they adopt an individualism orientation, and
once they find evidence of others breaking the rules, they too then break the rules.
Third, the way in which the set of rules resolved distributional issues may make it very tempting
to break the rules. In other words, some individuals may substantially benefit from breaking the
rules. For instance, a fisher may have been allocated an initial quota of fish, in part based on
historic catch that is too small to sustain his operation. He may view his choice as breaking the
rules or going out of business.
Commitment problems may be substantially resolved through monitoring. Monitoring individual
behavior for rule breaking actions may provide resource users with the assurance they need to
remain committed to a set of rules. Heterogeneities among resource uses can affect monitoring of
the agreement. For instance, some resource users, because of greater resources, or higher levels
of investment in harvesting technologies may be able to land and sell harvested flows outside of
the market network being monitored. This allows them to harvest more than what was allocated
to them without easily being caught. Thus, monitoring is critical for commitment, and
commitment is critical for the supply of rules that allow individuals to achieve better outcomes
(Ostrom 1990:45). Each of these three activities, in turn, is strongly affected by heterogeneities
among resource users.
When and why do heterogeneities matter? While specific predictions are impossible,
heterogeneities matter in many more instances and many more settings than is recognized in non-
cooperative game theory. Heterogeneities matter not only when they effect the payoff structure of
outcomes, they also matter as resource users search for and implement institutional arrangements
intended to allow them to resolve their cpr dilemmas and achieve better outcomes than they are
currently achieving.
Mechanisms for Addressing Heterogeneities and Resolving Dilemmas
The institutional arrangements that resource users utilize to resolve cpr dilemmas are diverse.
While markets and hierarchies are most commonly discussed in literatures ranging from public
administration to biology, as Ostrom (1990) and many others have so forcefully argued and
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demonstrated, there are numerous other types of arrangements, characterized by hundreds of
different combinations of rules.
These diverse institutional arrangements that resource users utilize share at least one thing in
common -- they attempt to address and resolve similar types of issues. They are devised to solve
shared problems that resource users experience. In order to resolve common pool resource
dilemmas, however, these institutional arrangements must address a number of other problems,
specifically issues around distribution, commitment, and monitoring. The fact that these
institutional arrangements address numerous issues in addition to cpr dilemmas is reflected in the
criteria often used to evaluate them. Institutional arrangements are evaluated on the basis of
effectiveness – how well the arrangements addressed dilemmas; fairness – how the arrangements
addressed distributional issues; ease of monitoring and enforcement – how the arrangements
addressed issues of commitment and monitoring; and efficiency.
The institutional arrangements are multi-dimensional. One dimension, however, that has not
received much attention is how these institutional arrangements address the challenge of
heterogeneous resource users. In general, most institutional arrangements use one or more of
three approaches for addressing and neutralizing the obstacles presented by heterogeneities –
separate, consolidate, or eliminate.
Separate
One general approach to addressing heterogeneities is to separate resource users from one
another. Separation can take a variety of forms. An extreme form of separation is to allocate
individual private property rights to portions of a resource. Individual private property rights
substantially reduce the need for resource users to work together to collectively resolve shared
problems. By allocating each user a “piece” of the resource, users first and foremost need to pay
attention to their own actions. The outcomes an individual achieves under this institutional
arrangement primarily depend on her actions, and not the actions of others. Individual private
property rights address the challenge of heterogeneities by separating individuals from one
another.
Individual private property rights may reduce the effects of heterogeneities once in place;
however, the process of devising such arrangements highlights the differences among individual
resource users. Resource users will differ on the basis of any single criterion used to allocate
individual private property rights. If rights are allocated by auction, then differences among
individuals in terms of resources to participate in an auction are highlighted. If rights are allocated
by individual historic harvest levels, then differences in amounts of effort invested in the resource
are emphasized. Heterogeneities play a significant role in the process of determining how to
initially allocate individual private property rights.
A less extreme form of separation is to divide a resource among homogenous groups of resource
users. Instead of separating individuals from one another, groups of users, who differ on a salient
dimension, are separated from one another. Thus, homogenous groups can collectively decide
how they will use their portion of a cpr without having to work with groups against whom they
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compete. For instance, there are numerous examples of fishermen divided among types of gear,
with each gear type allocated a portion of the fishing ground. Or, in Arizona, groundwater is
allocated among the three major users of water – agriculture, municipalities, and mining and
industry. Each group is allocated a portion of groundwater and each group has a set of rules and
regulations that governs its use of groundwater. Just as is the case with individual private property
rights, heterogeneities play a significant role in the initial allocation of portions of the resource to
homogenous groups of users.
Finally, another form of separation is for users who are homogenous on a salient dimension to
organize and address shared problems separately from other users who are heterogeneous on the
salient dimension. This form of separation may downplay the role of heterogeneities in relation to
the initial allocation of shares of the resource because the resource need not be portioned off. For
this type of separation to work, the homogeneous groups of users must exercise sufficient control
over their shared problems so that by collectively working together they can substantially address
them. While this form of separation may have the desired effects of downplaying distributional
issues among heterogeneous resource users, and allowing groups of resource users to address and
resolve their own problems, it may have the unfortunate consequence of marginalizing resource
users not part of the original homogenous group.
Consolidate
Another approach to addressing heterogeneities is to coerce or convince heterogeneous resource
users to work together to solve shared problems. An extreme form of consolidation is to create a
single hierarchical organization in which key decision-makers possess sufficient authority to
impose rules and regulations on the organization’s diverse members. This approach is intended to
take care of the conflicts that erupt as a result of heterogeneities by “forcing” actors with diverse
backgrounds, preferences, and needs and wants to work together within the context of a single,
authoritative organization. Furthermore, once in an organization, the creation of organizational
culture and mission can begin to align individuals’ goals and preferences, promoting cooperation
(Miller 1989).
While on paper, such an extreme form of consolidation appears to be an effective mechanism for
resolving differences and dictating a common course of action, a number of authors have noted
distinct shortcomings with such an approach. Actors will simply bring their differences within the
organization and continue to compete, maneuver, and strategize among each other, making it
difficult for organizational decisions to occur (Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren 1961; Chisholm
1989). Or, as Scharpf (1997) points out, if one group of actors is given the authority to impose its
desired solutions, it can easily exploit other groups of actors different from itself.
Another form of consolidation centers on tying together, or consolidating, the problems of
heterogeneous actors rather than consolidating the actors themselves within a single organization.
Scharpf (1997:128) calls this “issue linkage or package deals”. Resource users who share a
common-pool resource may experience distinct types of dilemmas. One group of resource users
may experience one type of dilemma and another group of resource users may experience another
type. If neither group can resolve the dilemma that they face without assistance from the other,
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then it is possible to package these dilemmas and resolve them collectively. Issue linking often
occurs in irrigation systems.  Those situated towards the end of a canal depend upon those
towards the head of the canal to act in ways that allow water to flow to the end of the canal.
Those situated at the head of the canal may need the assistance of those towards the end of the
canal in maintaining the headworks and canals of the system.  By linking these two problems
irrigators may collectively resolve them.
Issue linking, however, requires issues that can be linked and resolved in ways that make everyone
better off. As Scharpf (1997:129-130) explains, “ If package deals can be reached at all, they will
typically have to involve two or more distinct policy areas with complementary asymmetries in
their interest constellations.” Without such possibilities for linking issues, it is unlikely that
heterogeneous groups will work together. For instance, while tailender irrigators are almost
invariably dependent on the cooperation of headender irrigators, the reverse is not always the
case. Headenders may not experience problems with which they need assistance from other
groups. This leaves tailenders vulnerable to the actions of headenders.
Eliminate
Elimination brings us in a full circle back to separation. Elimination is similar to separation in that
groups that are heterogeneous in relation to other groups, and who have veto power over any
cooperative arrangement, are separated and removed from a common-pool resource situation.
The most extreme form of elimination is extermination. Fortunately, there are other, less extreme
forms of elimination. If individual private property rights are defined in a common-pool resource,
and if they are made transferable, then some users’ claims to the resource can be purchased and
they can be removed from using the resource.
Another such form is to “purchase” any claims a group may have to the use of a common-pool
resource by providing a substitute for the flows of the resource. The remaining, more
homogenous, resource users then negotiate among themselves to resolve their shared problems.
This form of elimination is relatively common in resolving and settling Native American water
claims in the western United States. Water from projects built and operated by the federal
government is provided to groups of Native Americans to settle their claims to surface waters
governed by the states. Non-Indian state citizens then negotiate among themselves to address
shared water problems.
The different types of separation, consolidation, and elimination mechanisms are well-known in
the literatures on common-pool resources. They are well-known because they are embedded
within institutional arrangements used to address common pool resource dilemmas.
Conclusion
Heterogeneities among resource users are commonly viewed as anathema to resolving common-
pool resource dilemmas. Ostrom (1990:211) states that resource users are more likely to adopt a
set of rules that improves joint welfare if “appropriators will be affected in similar ways by the
proposed rule change”, which is only possible if appropriators are homogeneous in all important
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respects. While heterogeneities may, in many cases, confound attempts to resolve common-pool
resource dilemmas, they are ubiquitous. As the IAD framework demonstrates, there are numerous
dimensions on which resource users may differ. Furthermore, most attention to heterogeneities
has focused on attempting to reach agreements for solving shared problems. As both Ostrom
(1990) and Scharpf (1997) argue, reaching an agreement is only one step in resolving shared
problems, attention must be paid to implementation, including commitment and monitoring.
Heterogeneities may effect resource users’ willingness to follow as well as enforce rules.
Even though in many instances heterogeneities present substantial challenges to users of a shared
resource, they nevertheless surmount such obstacles and devise and implement institutional
arrangements. The issue then is how these arrangements address and overcome the obstacles
presented by differences among resource users.  In general, most institutional arrangements
devised to address common-pool resource dilemmas also address heterogeneities by separating
resource users into homogenous groups, forcing resource users to work together, or removing
groups of users from the resource. Thus, in evaluating institutional arrangements for managing
common-pool resources, attention must be paid not only to their efficiency, effectiveness, and
fairness, but also to how they resolve resource user heterogeneity.
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Endnotes
1 Heterogeneities among resource users are different from heterogeneities among different types
of cprs.  Heterogeneities among users refer to differences in characteristics among individuals.
Those differences may stem from cultural sources, such as gender roles or language, from
physical sources, such as location within a cpr, or from institutional sources, such as differences in
property rights (see Schlager and Blomquist 1998). Heterogeneities among different types of cprs
refer to differences in physical characteristics of natural resources. For instance, some fish stocks
are highly mobile, while other stocks are mostly sedentary. For a discussion of cpr heterogeneity
and how those physical heterogeneities affect the types of institutional arrangements that resource
users devise, see Schlager, Blomquist and Tang (1994).
2 Another issue that needs further study is how some types of heterogeneities support cooperation
among resource users. See Blomquist and Schlager (1997) and Schlager and Blomquist (1998)
for theoretical explanations of the conditions under which heterogeneities support and inhibit the
emergence of cooperation among resource users.
3 In fact, the problem of supply is a more nuanced and complete of a notion than is the search for
optimal solutions. The problem of supply involves devising a set of rules, which if followed, create
the possibility of adopting an optimal outcome. The problem of supply attends to how institutional
arrangements structure an action situation, or a game, so that optimal solutions are possible
outcomes. The search for optimal solutions does not attend to the institutional arrangements that
are necessary for optimal solutions to be reached.
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